Antinomy
CLICK HERE >>> https://tinurll.com/2tl9Re
There are many examples of antinomy. A self-contradictory phrase such as \"There is no absolute truth\" can be considered an antinomy because this statement is suggesting in itself to be an absolute truth, and therefore denies itself any truth in its statement. It is not necessarily also a paradox. A paradox, such as \"this sentence is false\" can also be considered to be an antinomy; in this case, for the sentence to be true, it must be false.
In Das Kapital, Volume I in the chapter entitled \"The Working Day\",[7] Karl Marx claims that capitalist production sustains \"the assertion of a right to an unlimited working day, and the assertion of a right to a limited working day, both with equal justification\".[8] Furner emphasizes that the thesis and antithesis of this antinomy are not contradictory opposites, but rather \"consist in the assertion of rights to states of affairs that are contradictory opposites\".[9]
How does Kant demonstrate this Both the thesis and antithesisarguments are apagogic, i.e., that they constitute indirect proofs. Anindirect proof establishes its conclusion by showing the impossibilityof its opposite. Thus, for example, we may want to know, as in thefirst antinomy, whether the world is finite or infinite. We can seekto show that it is finite by demonstrating the impossibility of itsinfinitude. Alternatively, we may demonstrate the infinitude of theworld by showing that it is impossible that it is finite. This isexactly what the thesis and antithesis arguments purport to do,respectively. The same strategy is deployed in the second antinomy,where the proponent of the thesis position argues for the necessity ofsome ultimately simple substance by showing the impossibility ofinfinite divisibility of substance, etc.
In the dynamical antinomies, Kant changes his strategy somewhat.Rather than arguing (as in the mathematical antinomies) that bothconclusions are false, Kant suggests that both sides to thedispute might turn out to be correct. This option is available here,and not in the two mathematical antinomies, because the proponents ofthe thesis arguments are not committing themselves solely to claimsabout spatio-temporal objects. In the third antinomy, the thesiscontends that in addition to mechanistic causality, we must posit somefirst uncaused causal power (Transcendental Freedom), while theantithesis denies anything but mechanistic causality. Here, then, thedebate is the standard (though in this case, the specificallycosmological) dispute between freedom and determinism. Finally, in thefourth antinomy, the requirement for a necessary being is pittedagainst its opposite. The thesis position argues for a necessarybeing, whereas the antithesis denies that there is any such being.
In his book Evangelism and the Sovereignty ofGod (Chicago:InterVarsity Press, 1961) J. I. Packer argues that the sovereigntyof God and the responsibility of man is an antinomy. He defines\"antinomy\" as \"an appearance of contradiction between conclusionswhich seem equally logical, reasonable or necessary\" (p. 18). It\"is neither dispensable nor comprehensible...It is unavoidable andinsoluble. We do not invent it, and we cannot explain it\" (p. 21).God \"orders and controls all things, human actions amongthem\"...yet \"He holds every man responsible for the choices hemakes and the courses of action he pursues\" (p. 22). \"To our finiteminds this is inexplicable\" (p. 23).
The first thing to notice here is that the antinomy as Packersees it is not between the sovereignty of God and the free will ofman. Packer is too good a biblical scholar to think there ever wassuch a thing as \"free will\" taught in the scripture. Thus the wholeconversation between him and myself can proceed on the cordialagreement that free will is an unbiblical notion that is not partof the antinomy because it is not part of revelation.
But now I would like to ask where Packer gets the idea that thisso-called antinomy between the sovereignty of God and theresponsibility of man is \"inexplicable\" to our finite minds Doeshe simply have an intuitive feeling that we can't understand theunity of these two truths Or is it that he has tried for 40 yearsto explain it and has found that he can't Or does he appeal to theendless disputes in the church on this subject Packer does nottell us why he thinks the antinomy is an antinomy. He simplyassumes that \"it sounds like a contradiction\" to everybody. He alsoassumes that anyone who is discontent with antinomy and tries toprobe into the consistency of its two halves is guilty ofsuspicious speculations (p. 24). I disagree with both assumptions:everybody does not think the sovereignty of God and theresponsibility of man are apparently contradictory (for exampleJonathan Edwards), nor is it in my judgment, improper to probe intothe very mind of God if done in the right spirit.
The other point of disagreement with Packer was his assumptionthat the two-fold presentation in scripture of God's sovereigntyand man's responsibility sounds to everybody like a contradiction.It didn't sound like one to Jonathan Edwards after he thought aboutit long enough and it doesn't sound like one to me. I think anyonewho is going to dogmatically assert that humans can't understandthis \"antinomy\" must first show that Jonathan Edwards has notunderstood it. I will try to develop in the briefest possible wayhow Edwards attempts to show \"that God's moral government overmankind, his treating them as moral agents, making them the objectsof his commands, counsels, calls, warnings, expostulations,promises, threatenings, rewards and punishments, is notinconsistent with a determining disposal of all events, of everykind, throughout the universe, in his providence: either bypositive efficiency, or permission\" (The Freedom of the Will,Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 1969 p. 258. All pagenumbers below are from this edition.)
This distinction between moral inability and natural inabilityis crucial in Edwards' solution to the so-called antinomy betweenGod's sovereign disposal of all things and man's accountability.The solution is this: Moral ability is not a prerequisite toaccountability. Natural ability is. \"All inability that excuses maybe resolved into one thing; namely, want of natural capacity orstrength; either capacity of understanding, or external strength\"(p. 150).
Therefore moral inability and moral necessity on the one handand human accountability on the other are not an antinomy. Theirunity is not contrary to reason or to the common moral experienceof mankind. Therefore, in order to see how God's sovereignty andman's responsibility perfectly cohere, one need only realize thatthe way God works in the world is not by imposing natural necessityon men and then holding them accountable for what they can't doeven though they will to do it. But rather God so disposes allthings (Eph. 1:11) so that in accordance with moral necessity allmen make only those choices ordained by God from all eternity.
As distinct from a sophism, which is a deliberately presented erroneous conclusion containing a masked error, an antinomy is usually an indication of deeper deficiencies of the theory in question. The discovery of an antinomy often leads to a thorough revision of the theory as a whole, attracts attention to new effects, and ultimately stimulates further studies. This feature of antinomies attracted the interest of philosophers ever since ancient times. One may recall, for example, the important role played by antinomies in the philosophy of E. Kant. A number of antinomies were studied in antiquity under the name aporium. Here, two famous antinomies named after Zeno of Elea (5th century B.C.) will be quoted.
An antinomy is a real or apparent contradiction between equally well-based assumptions or conclusions. Contradiction is a generic term for both paradox and antinomy, which are roughly synonymous. However, many recent writers employ paradox as an informal catchall for interesting contradictions of any sort, and antinomy as a technical term for contradictions derivable by sound rules of reasoning from accepted axioms within a science. Antinomies may for convenience be gathered under three headings, depending on whether they arise: (1) in ordinary language; (2) in metaphysics or cosmology; or (3) in logic, mathematics, and kindred formal disciplines.
Antinomies in Formal Systems. At the turn of the 20th century, antinomies of a different sort forced logicians and mathematicians to reconsider certain accepted fundamentals, chiefly in the foundations of arithmetic. Russell's antinomy, discovered in 1901, was derived from the efforts of Gottlob Frege to develop number theory in terms of the theory of classes. It can be paraphrased in nontechnical terms as follows: The class of all classes is itself a class, but the class of all lions is not a lion. Some classes, then, appear to be members of themselves while others do not. Now consider the whole class of classes which are not members of themselves. Call it C. Is C a member of itself or not Let us suppose that it is. That would make C a member of a class that is by definition made up of classes that are not members of themselves. Therefore C is not a member of itself, which contradicts the original supposition. On the other hand, if we now suppose it is not, then on second look C must be included in the membership it was defined as having, and so must be counted a member of itself. Whether we call C a member of itself or not, the result leads to the opposite position.
Semantical Antinomies. It is now common practice to distinguish between antinomies containing reference to natural language, and those involving no metalinguistic expressions. The first kind are called semantical, the second logical. One example of the former, called Grelling's paradox, runs as follows: Work up two lists of adjectives, the first titled self-describing and containing words that apply to themselves, such as \"mispelled,\" \"short,\" \"four-syllabled\" the second titled non-selfdescribing and containing words that do not, such as \"long,\" \"misspelled,\" \"five-syllabled.\" Into which list shall we put the term \"non-self-describing\" If it is a non-self-describing word, as \"short\" is a short word, then it belongs under self-describing. But in order to go there, \"non-self-describing\" would have to be non-selfdescribing, as \"short\" is short. Put into either list, it switches into the other. This antinomy, like that of Russell, can be solved by employing suitable type restrictions. 59ce067264